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Sleep and dreaming do not serve a single biological function, but are multifunc-
tional. Their functions include memory consolidation and integration, emotion reg-
ulation, creativity and problem solving, and preparation for waking life. One prom-
ising level of description is that of dreaming as a virtual reality: The dreamer in-
teracts  with a simulated environment including other simulated avatars.  While
dreaming can be considered a multifunctional general reality simulator, the threat
simulation and social simulation functions of dreaming are unique among other
dream functions in their ability to explain a striking feature of dream phenomeno-
logy: obliviousness towards the true state of mind. 
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1 Introduction
Sleep  is  an  almost  ubiquitous  phenomenon
within  the  animal  kingdom,  existing  in  all
higher  and  many  lower  species.  The  specific
function of  sleep,  however,  is  still  an enigma:
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sleep helps an organism to save energy through
extended periods of inactivity, yet at the same
time leaves it in a potentially dangerous state of
non-responsiveness. While several possible func-
tions  of  sleep  have  been  discussed  in  recent
years (Frank 2006;  Vassalli &  Dijk 2009),  the
function of dreaming might be seen as an even
bigger mystery: the hyper-realistic imagery ex-
perienced during dreaming does not inform the
organism  about  its  current  environment,  and
the virtual motor activity processed in interac-
tion with these hallucinations is not executed to
affect  the  external  world—or  even  worse,  in
pathological conditions like REM sleep behavior
disorder it is, thereby threatening the health of
the dreamer and his bed partner. After awaken-
ing from a dream, the often emotionally-toned
preoccupation  with  the  dream  narrative  can
confuse the dreamer and distract his from po-
tentially dangerous conditions in the real world.
An  increasingly  widespread  idea  is  that
the function of dreaming consists in the simula-
tion of waking life. In a variation of their threat
simulation theory (TST; Revonsuo 1995, 2000),
Revonsuo et al. (this collection) now propose a
social simulation theory of dreaming (SST), ac-
cording to which dream function could best be
characterized as simulating social reality. Con-
sidering  the  social  nature  of  most  of  our
dreams,  SST  is  an  intuitively  plausible  ap-
proach, and Revonsuo et al. review a number of
studies that provide support for SST. Neverthe-
less, several questions remain to be clarified: is
the prime function of dreaming threat simula-
tion  or  social  simulation—or  something  com-
pletely  different?  What  is  the  relationship
between the various proposed functions of sleep
and dreaming, including TST and SST? If the
TST and SST turn out not to be the sole or
even prime functions of dreaming, do they nev-
ertheless provide unique insights into the func-
tion of dreaming?
In this commentary, I shall review several
widely  propagated  functions  of  sleep  and
dreaming. I shall then compare these functions
with the social and threat simulation functions
of  dreaming,  and  finally  discuss  why  and  in
which regard these two functions might be spe-
cial. I shall argue that the merit of TST and
SST is  not  the  conclusive  explanation  of  the
function of dreaming—which I consider a multi-
functional state—, but that they are the only
candidates  among  the  variety  of  dream func-
tions that are capable of explaining a striking
feature of  most  dreams:  obliviousness  towards
the current state of mind. 
2 Sleep physiology and the function of 
dreaming
When speculating about the function of dream-
ing,  some clarifications  about the level  of  ex-
planation  are  necessary.  By  definition  (e.g.,
Windt 2010), dreaming is a phenomenon occur-
ring during sleep.  In  an  account  of  biological
realism (Revonsuo 2006), the function of dream-
ing cannot be discussed independently from the
neurophysiology of sleep. Even if the phenomen-
ology of dreaming serves a function that can be
conceptually (and maybe evolutionarily) differ-
entiated from the original function realized by
its physiological correlates, this function is not
independent from the neurophysiology of sleep
and its specific functions: if the neurophysiolo-
gical  functions  change  their  mechanisms,  this
would also affect the phenomenological aspects
of dreaming—philosophically speaking, phenom-
enal properties of dreaming supervene on neuro-
physiological  properties  of  sleep.  However,
neither can the function of dreaming be equated
with the function of sleep, since there are func-
tions of sleep for which it is rather unlikely that
any phenomenological aspects play a role, e.g.,
myelin sheath proliferation (Bellesi et al. 2013);
synaptic  downscaling (Tononi &  Cirelli 2006);
metabolite clearance (Xie et al. 2013); or gen-
eral  metabolic  (Morselli et  al. 2012)  and  im-
munological functions (Besedovsky et al. 2012).
There are also functions of sleep that might be
described conceptually without referring to phe-
nomenal aspects, but in fact happen to be bio-
logically associated with dream mentation, e.g.,
physiological microprocesses underlying memory
consolidation (see below).  And in these cases,
one can differentiate dream phenomenology and
sleep physiology on a conceptual, but not biolo-
gical level—unless one adopts a radically dual-
istic approach, that is. Hence, speaking of the
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function of dreaming —in contrast to the func-
tion  of  sleep  more  generally—always  implies
both  phenomenological  and  physiological  as-
pects. 
When considering the neurophysiology of
dreaming, coarse sleep stages as defined by clas-
sical polysomnography have been the prime tar-
gets of investigation. Among these, REM sleep
harbors the most prototypical  dreams, with a
story-like dream narrative including interactive
visuomotor  hallucinations  and  often  intense
emotions. In addition, REM sleep dreams can
be  most  elegantly  related  to  their  neuro-
physiological correlates (Hobson &  Pace-Schott
2002).  Nevertheless,  dream-like  mentation  can
be found in in all sleep stages (Nielsen 2000),
and  hence  also  the  neurophysiology  of  other
sleep stages has to be taken into account when
investigating the function of dreaming. In con-
clusion, when speculating about the function of
dreaming,  all  those  REM  and  NREM  sleep
functions have to be considered that can reason-
ably be expected to be associated with phenom-
enal aspects.  In the following, I will  highlight
four clusters of such sleep functions. 
3 Dream function 1: Memory 
consolidation and integration 
In recent years, the most widely discussed func-
tion of sleep and dreaming concerns the consol-
idation  of  declarative  memory,  including  se-
mantic, episodic, and autobiographical informa-
tion; and procedural memory including percep-
tual and motor skills (Rasch & Born 2013). In
particular  the  role  of  REM sleep  in  memory
consolidation has been studied for several dec-
ades. While many studies from the 1970s have
been criticized for being heavily confounded by
too stressful REM sleep deprivation procedures
(Horne & McGrath 1984), research in the 1990s
raised  interest  in  the  role  of  REM sleep  for
memory  consolidation:  Karni (1994)  demon-
strated that a basic visual discrimination task
improved after a normal night’s sleep, but not
after selective REM sleep deprivation. Following
this, a leading research aim in the field has been
to identify which memory systems benefit from
which  sleep  stages:  it  was  demonstrated  that
early deep sleep benefits declarative memories,
while late REM-rich sleep supports procedural
skills (Plihal & Born 1997). Further support for
the role  of  REM sleep  in  procedural  memory
consolidation  came from studies  showing  that
REM sleep  intensity  (total  number  of  REMs
and REM densities) increased following proced-
ural-task acquisition (Smith et al. 2004) and im-
provements in procedural memory performance
after a night of sleep were proportional to time
spent  in  REM  sleep  (Fischer et  al. 2002).
Moreover,  brain areas activated during a pro-
cedural learning task were more active during
REM sleep in subjects who were trained at the
task (Maquet et al. 2000; Peigneux et al. 2003). 
More  recent  studies,  however,  speak
against a prominent role of REM sleep in the
consolidation of procedural motor skills or other
forms of non-emotional memories, and instead
emphasize non-REM sleep processes (Genzel et
al. 2014). On the neurophysiological level, it has
been  suggested  that  dreaming  represents  the
phenomenological reflection of a neural replay of
activation patterns associated with recent learn-
ing experiences (Wilson &  McNaughton 1994;
Wamsley & Stickgold 2011; Wamsley 2014). Al-
though  memory  reactivations  have  been  ob-
served in REM sleep as well (Louie &  Wilson
2001),  the  most  advanced  models  of  sleep-re-
lated memory consolidation propose that neural
replay is orchestrated by an interaction of non-
REM sleep microprocesses, including slows os-
cillations  and  sleep  spindles  (Genzel et  al.
2014). 
Events and episodes from waking life are
sometimes incorporated into dreams, either as
classical  day-residues  the  following  night  or
after a “dream lag” of about 5–7 days (Nielsen
& Powell 1989; Nielsen et al. 2004). Supporting
the idea that such dream incorporations reflect
processes of  memory consolidation, items that
were  incorporated  into  dreams  have  been  ob-
served to lead to better memory retention (de
Koninck et al. 1990; Cipolli et al. 2004). While
an actual episodic replay of waking events was
found in no more than 1–2% of the dream re-
ports  (Fosse et  al. 2003),  with  NREM-sleep
dreams appearing to include more  identifiable
episodic  memory  sources  than  REM-sleep
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dreams (Baylor & Cavallero 2001), it has been
suggested  that  particularly  engaging  learning
experiences  have  a  more  robust  influence  on
dream content relative to more passive experi-
ences (Wamsley 2014). 
In contrast to recent episodes, incorpora-
tions of autobiographical memory features could
be identified in the majority of dreams (Malin-
owski &  Horton 2014).  This  suggests  that
dreaming  might  serve  to  assimilate  recent
memory  fragments  into  autobiographical
memory  schemas  and  thus  supports  autobio-
graphical  self-model  maintenance  (Metzinger
2013). For semantic memories, evidence of a re-
lationship  between  dreaming  and  neural
memory reactivations stems from studies of de-
clarative  memory  that  present  memory  cues
during sleep: these cues, when associated with
the pre-sleep learning session, induce associated
dream imagery  (Schredl et  al. 2014)  and  en-
hance post-sleep memory retrieval (Rasch et al.
2007). For procedural memories, learning of an
engaging visuomotor task led to integration of
task-related  imagery  into  dream-like  activity
during non-REM sleep (Wamsley et al. 2010a),
and such dream-incorporations of recent learn-
ing  experiences  were  associated  with  later
memory  performance  (Wamsley et  al. 2010b).
This  memory-enhancing  re-experience  reminds
us  of  motor  imagery training  during  wakeful-
ness, which has been repeatedly demonstrated
to  improve  motor  skills  (Driskell et  al. 1994;
Schuster et al. 2011). 
Recently  it  has  been  suggested  that  in-
stead  of  consolidating  memories,  REM  sleep
serves  as  a  state of  elaborative  (re-)encoding,
during which the hippocampus integrates recent
episodic memory fragments into remote episodic
memories  (Llewellyn 2013).  It  has  been  pro-
posed  that  this  process  relies  upon  principles
that  also  underlie  the  mnemonic  encoding
strategies of ancient orators, such as vivid, com-
plex and often bizarre associative imagery, nar-
ratives with embodiment of oneself, and associ-
ations with known locations, later serving as re-
trieval cues. Subjectively, this process would be
experienced  as  the  typical  dream  mentation
with its hyper-associative and bizarre imagery.
However,  despite  being  intuitively  appealing,
several theoretical considerations and empirical
findings are inconsistent with the idea of mne-
monic encoding strategies acting during dream-
ing (Dresler & Konrad 2013). 
To sum up, a first important function of
sleep  and  dreaming  is  memory  consolidation
and integration, including the rehearsal of pro-
cedural motor skills, replay of episodic and se-
mantic  memories,  and  integration  of  memory
episodes into autobiographical memory schemas.
4 Dream function 2: Emotion regulation
Converging evidence  suggests  that  the  regula-
tion  of  emotional  processes  is  an  important
function of sleep and dreaming. Early content
analyses  of  REM  sleep  dreams  showed  that
many  dreams  are  highly  emotional,  with  un-
pleasant  emotions  prevailing  (Hall &  Van de
Castle 1966;  Snyder 1970). This is in line with
neuroimaging  studies  of  REM  sleep,  demon-
strating that neural areas involved in emotion
regulation like the amygdala, medial prefrontal
cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex are highly
activated  during  REM  sleep  (Nir &  Tononi
2010).  Several REM-sleep characteristics differ
between healthy subjects scoring low in depres-
sion scales and those with higher but still sub-
clinical  depression  scores  (Cartwright et  al.
1998). After highly emotional life events, REM
sleep changes can be observed in those subjects
that  react  with  symptoms  of  depression
(Cartwright 1983),  and  dreams  of  depressed
subjects  differ  from  patients  in  remission
(Cartwright et al. 2006). Likewise, in depressed
patients  the  distribution  of  rapid  eye  move-
ments in REM sleep differs in nights after which
mood is estimated better than in the preceding
evening compared to nights after which mood is
unchanged (Indursky & Rotenberg 1998). It was
therefore  proposed  that  REM sleep  dreaming
serves as a mood regulation system and that a
disturbance of this process might play a role in
the  development  of  affective  disorders
(Cartwright 2011). Changes in REM sleep are
symptomatic  of  affective  disorders  and  the
sleep-memory  relationship  is  altered  in  these
diseases (Dresler et al. 2014).  In healthy sub-
jects,  the  consolidation  of  emotional  texts
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(Wagner et al. 2001) or pictures (Hu et al. 2006;
Nishida et al. 2009) is enhanced through REM
sleep, an effect that has been shown to last for
several years (Wagner et al. 2006). 
While  at  first  sight  it  might  look  as  if
REM sleep unequivocally strengthens emotional
memory processes, some studies suggest a more
complex picture: referring to the fact that emo-
tional experiences are remembered better than
neutral ones, however their emotional tone dur-
ing  retrieval  decreases  with  time,  it  was  pro-
posed that REM sleep serves an emotional de-
coupling function: we sleep to remember emo-
tionally-tagged  information  yet  at  the  same
time  to  forget  the  associated  emotional  tone
(Walker &  van  der  Helm 2009).  While  some
studies  support  this  model  (Hu et  al. 2006;
Nishida et al. 2009), others suggest that the af-
fective tone of emotional memories is preserved
rather than reduced during REM sleep (Groch
et al. 2013). 
Besides  negative  emotions,  sleep  and
dreaming have also been associated with pos-
itive  affects.  Recent  dream  report  analyses
suggest that positive emotions in dreams have
been underestimated in  previous  studies  and
might  be  even  more  common  than  negative
emotions (Malcolm-Smith et al. 2012; Sikka et
al. 2014).  In  addition,  the  processing  of  re-
ward has been associated with REM sleep and
dreaming.  For  example,  the  expectancy  of  a
reward  enhances  memory  consolidation  pro-
cesses  during  sleep  (Fischer &  Born 2009),
and reactivations of neural activity related to
a reward-searching task have been observed in
reward-related brain regions such as the vent-
ral  striatum  during  sleep  (Pennartz et  al.
2004). Instead of a simulation of purely avers-
ive content such as threats, according to this
account sleep favors the activation of repres-
entations of high emotional and motivational
relevance in general (Perogamvros & Schwartz
2012, 2014).
In summary, a second important function
of sleep and dreaming is the regulation of emo-
tions, including both an enhancement of emo-
tionally-tagged information and a decoupling of
this information from its associated emotional
tone.
5 Dream function 3: Creativity and 
problem solving
Anecdotal reports on scientific discovery, invent-
ive originality, and artistic productivity suggest
that creativity can be triggered or enhanced by
sleeping and dreaming. Several studies confirm
these  anecdotes,  showing  that  sleep  promotes
creative problem-solving compared to wakeful-
ness. For example, when subjects performed a
cognitive task that could be solved much faster
through applying a hidden rule, after a night of
sleep more than twice as many subjects gained
insight  into  the  hidden  rule  as  in  a  control
group staying awake (Wagner et al. 2004). Sim-
ilarly,  subjects  benefited  in  a  creativity  task
from an  afternoon  nap  but  not  from staying
awake (Cai et al. 2009;  Beijamini et al. 2014),
and  the  likelihood  of  solving  a  problem  en-
countered before sleep can be increased by cued
reactivations during sleep (Ritter et al. 2012).
According to the classical stage model of
creativity, creative insights may be described by
a process consisting of several stages, of which
the incubation phase appears to be most intim-
ately  associated  with  sleep  and  dreaming
(Dresler 2011,  2012;  Ritter &  Dijksterhuis
2014).  The  most  common  psychological  ap-
proaches  support  this  view:  psychoanalytical
models of creativity emphasize the primary pro-
cess concept, which denotes free-associative and
dream-like thinking, compared to the more ra-
tional and analytical secondary-process thinking
(Kris 1952).  Cognitive  models  propose  that  a
state of defocused attention facilitates creativity
(Mendelsohn 1976)—creative  individuals  seem
to have less narrowly-focused attention than un-
creative ones,  which leads to unorthodox con-
nections of remote ideas that might eventually
lead  to  creative  cognitions.  In  a  similar  vein,
creative individuals are thought to have relat-
ively flat association hierarchies (i.e., more, yet
weaker  associations  between  cognitive  ele-
ments), which accounts for the ability to make
remote  associations;  whereas  uncreative  indi-
viduals are thought to have relatively steep as-
sociation hierarchies (Mednick 1962). Physiolo-
gical  models  emphasize  the  level  of  cortical
arousal as an important variable influencing cre-
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ativity: both a lower level of cortical arousal—
particularly  in  the  prefrontal  cortex—and  a
higher variability in cortical arousal levels are
expected in creative compared to uncreative in-
dividuals,  depending on specific phases  of  the
creative process (Martindale 1999). In addition,
low levels of norepinephrine are thought to facil-
itate  creativity,  shifting  the  brain  toward  in-
trinsic neuronal activation with an increase in
the size  of  distributed concept  representations
and  co-activation  across  modular  networks
(Heilman et  al. 2003).  The  prefrontal  cortex
seems to be of particular importance for creat-
ive  processes;  however  there  is  evidence  that
both prefrontal activation and prefrontal deac-
tivation facilitate creativity—maybe depending
on  the  specific  phase  of  the  creative  process.
Brain areas showing selective activation for in-
sight events are—besides the prefrontal cortex—
the  visual  cortices,  the  hippocampus,  and  in
particular the anterior cingulated cortex, which
is thought to be involved in breaking the im-
passe that marks the critical step of insight into
a problem (Dietrich & Kanso 2010).
Both  theoretical  models  and  empirical
neuroscience of creativity suggest that sleep and
dreaming provide an ideal environment for cre-
ative incubation: primary-process thinking is ex-
plicitly  conceptualized  as  dream-like,  and  the
hyper-associative nature of dreams can be con-
sidered  a  prime  example  of  a  flat  associative
hierarchy. Defocused attention is a phenomenal
feature of most dreams, physiologically probably
caused  by prefrontal  cortex deactivation.  And
daydreaming has the potential to increase cre-
ativity (Lewin 1989), while the level of engage-
ment in such mind-wandering in contrast to ex-
plicitly directed thoughts is associated with cre-
ative performance (Baird et al. 2012). The sleep
cycle provides the brain with highly alternating
arousal levels, and the chaotic activation of the
cortex in REM sleep through brain stem regions
in  absence  of  external  sense  data  leads  to  a
much more radical renunciation of unsuccessful
problem solving attempts, leading to co-activa-
tions of cognitive data that are highly remote in
waking life (Kahn et al. 2002a). These co-activ-
ations, woven into a dream narrative in a self-
organizing  manner,  repeatedly  receive  further
innervations  by  the  brainstem,  leading  to
bizarre  sequences  of  loosely  associated  dream
topics that might eventually activate particular
problem-relevant  cognitions  or  creative  cogni-
tions in general (Hobson & Wohl 2005). In addi-
tion, in REM sleep, which is characterized by
low levels of norepinephrine, visual cortices, the
hippocampus, and the anterior cingulate cortex
have all  been shown to be strongly activated,
potentially facilitating insight events. In conclu-
sion,  the  phenomenological  and  neural  correl-
ates of sleeping and dreaming provide ideal con-
ditions for the genesis of creative ideas and in-
sights.
In summary, a third important function of
sleep and dreaming is the association of remote
cognitive elements in order to facilitate creativ-
ity and problem solving.
6 Dream function 4: Preparation and 
simulation of waking life
Consolidation,  integration,  regulation,  and  re-
evaluation of acquired information during sleep
prepare the organism for its waking life. How-
ever, such processes do not necessarily need to
be purely reactive, depending solely on the ex-
periences of the preceding day: several authors
propose  that  a  major  function  of  sleep  and
dreaming might include primarily preparational
mechanisms. Since REM sleep dominates sleep
more  during  early  developmental  periods  in
comparison  to  later  in  life,  some  researchers
have  argued  that  REM sleep  plays  a  role  in
early  brain  maturation (Roffwarg et  al. 1966;
Marks et  al. 1995;  Mirmiran 1995);  however,
also a life-long preparational function of REM
sleep has been proposed. One of  the first  ap-
proaches in this direction was offered by Jouvet
(1979), who combined the brain maturation hy-
pothesis  with  a  metaphor  offered  by  Dewan
(1970), in which he claims that the brain is a
computer  that  is  programmed  during  REM
sleep—suggesting that innate behaviors are re-
hearsed during REM-sleep dreaming in order to
prepare  the  organism  for  their  application  in
waking life.  Jouvet later revised his approach,
assuming that REM sleep constitutes an iterat-
ive genetic programming that helps to maintain
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the  process  of  psychological  individuation
(Jouvet 1998). In a similar vein, Hobson (2009)
proposed  that  REM  sleep  may  constitute  a
“protoconscious” state, preparing the organism
for waking conscious experiences. The develop-
ment of consciousness during ontogenetic devel-
opment in this view is a gradual and lifelong
process, building on the more primitive innate
virtual reality generator, which is phenomenally
experienced as dreaming. With the recent integ-
ration of  Friston’s (2010) predictive coding ap-
proach into this theory, the brain is thought to
run a virtual world model (see also  Revonsuo
1995,  2006;  Metzinger 2003)  that  is  continu-
ously  updated  by processing  prediction  errors
during wakefulness. Freed from external sensory
constraints,  processing  of  prediction  errors  in
the dreaming brain actively refines intermediate
hierarchy  levels  of  the  virtual  world  model.
Dreaming  thereby  minimizes  internal  model
complexity in order to generate more efficient
predictions  during  subsequent  wakefulness
(Hobson & Friston 2012; Hobson et al. 2014).
One of the first and today the most widely
discussed  preparational  approach  is  based  on
the observation that during dreaming particu-
larly threatening experiences  are overrepresen-
ted: the Threat Simulation Theory (TST) pro-
poses that one function of sleep is to simulate
threatening events, and to rehearse threat per-
ception and threat avoidance (Revonsuo 1995,
2000).  Such  a  mechanism  of  simulating  the
threats  of  waking  life  over  and over  again in
various combinations would be valuable for the
development and maintenance of  threat-avoid-
ance  skills.  Several  empirical  studies  support
TST (Revonsuo 2006;  Valli & Revonsuo 2009),
however some inconstant findings have been re-
ported (Zadra et al. 2006; Malcolm-Smith et al.
2008, 2012). In a variation of TST, Revonsuo et
al. (this collection) propose the Social Simula-
tion Theory (SST), according to which the func-
tion of dreaming consists in the simulating of
“the social  skills,  bonds, interactions and net-
works  that  we  engage  in  during  our  waking
lives”. The SST aims to predict and explain the
simulations  of  social  interaction  of  dream
avatars that happen outside threatening events
in dreams. Like the TST, predictions of the SST
are supported by a number of studies, but face
inconsistent data (Revonsuo et al. this collec-
tion). 
On a neurobiological level, empirical sup-
port for simulation theories of dreaming comes
from  a  recent  study  demonstrating  that  the
ventromedial  prefrontal  cortex  subserves  the
simulation and evaluation of possible future ex-
periences, integrating arbitrary combinations of
knowledge structures to simulate the emergent
affective quality that a possible future episode
may hold (Benoit et al. 2014). As the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex is known to be activ-
ated in REM sleep (Nir &  Tononi 2010), this
mechanism might also underlie episodes of real-
ity simulation during dreaming. Further neuro-
biological support for the preparational role of
sleep comes from recent research demonstrating
a  neural  “preplay”  of  future  learning-related
place-cell sequences in the hippocampus (Dragoi
& Tonegawa 2011, 2013). In contrast to the in-
tuitive  view that  such activation  patterns  are
established for the first time during a novel ex-
perience, according to these findings the specific
temporal firing sequence during learning seems
rather to be selected from a larger repertoire of
preexisting activation patterns, thus suggesting
that  sleep  plays  a  role  not  only  in  the  sub-
sequent consolidation, but also in the preceding
preparation  for  new  experiences.  It  has  been
demonstrated that sleep preceding the learning
experience indeed influences memory acquisition
during the following day (van der Werf et al.
2009). Interestingly, support for the hypothesis
that sleep mentation constitutes a virtual real-
ity model preparing for waking life comes also
from research outside of sleep neuroscience: ap-
proaches  probing  artificial  intelligence  demon-
strate  that  robots  perform  better  in  naviga-
tional tasks if they create and update models of
their own structure and actions during a state
of motoric inactivity (Bongard et al. 2006). Not
surprisingly, this process of evaluation and sim-
ulation of  prior  and future actions was inter-
preted as dream-like (Adami 2006).
In summary, a fourth important function
of sleep and dreaming is preparation for waking
life. This includes proposals of REM sleep as an
iterative genetic programming system, dreaming
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as  a  state  of  protoconsciousness  and  virtual
world model  optimization,  and dreaming as a
simulation of threats (TST) and social interac-
tions (SST).
7 The multifunctionality of dreaming
Numerous suggestions for solving the mystery of
sleep and dream function can be found in the
literature.  In  the  previous  sections  I  have  re-
viewed  four  clusters  of  proposed  functions  of
sleep and dreaming: 1) consolidation of recently
acquired memories, including procedural motor
skill  rehearsal,  replay  of  recently  acquired
memories, and integration of memory episodes
into autobiographical memory schemas; 2) emo-
tion regulation, including both an enhancement
of  emotionally-tagged  information  and  a  de-
coupling of this information from its associated
emotional tone; 3) creativity and problem solv-
ing; and (4) preparation and simulation of wak-
ing  life,  including  iterative  genetic  program-
ming,  virtual  world  model  optimization,  the
simulation of threats (TST), and the simulation
of social interactions (SST). The question thus
remains what the real  or  primary function of
sleep and dreaming is—and what the relation-
ship between the different candidates might be.
SST aims to independently cover the social sim-
ulations  that  fall  outside  the  scope  of  TST,
thereby  describing  an  “original  evolutionary
function  of  dreams  alongside  with  the  threat
simulation function of dreaming” (Revonsuo et
al. this collection). 
The concept of evolutionary function has
been one of the main topics in the philosophy of
biology (Mahner & Bunge 2000) and philosophy
of mind (Millikan 1984; Neander 1991). Several
notions  of  biological  functions  exist  (Wouters
2003); however a general idea is that the biolo-
gical  function  of  a  trait  is  determined  by  its
contribution  to  evolutionary  fitness  (Walsh &
Ariew 1996).  Darwin (1871)  differentiated
between selection occurring as a consequence of
ecological factors that directly threaten the or-
ganism’s  survival,  such  as  predators  or  other
potentially  life-threatening  dangers  of  nature,
and interactions with members of the same spe-
cies  in  order  to compete for  mating partners.
Both principles, dubbed natural and sexual se-
lection respectively, eventually determine repro-
ductive success as the ultimate decision points
for selection. In contemporary accounts, sexual
selection was generalized to the concept of so-
cial selection, of which the former is considered
a subtype (Lyon &  Montgomerie 2012;  West-
Eberhard 2014). The concept of runaway selec-
tion,  famously  illustrated  by  the  evolution  of
the peacock’s tail, was thought to also be ap-
plicable to the evolution of social skills in higher
animals, eventually leading to the development
of theory of mind, language, dance, or artistic
creativity in humans (Flinn & Alexander 2007).
This  process  of  an  arms  race  of  social  skills
would  require  increasing  cognitive  capacity—
and in fact, at least in primates, relative brain
size has been related to social group size (Dun-
bar 1992; Dunbar & Shultz 2007). 
It is tempting to associate natural and so-
cial selection as the main principles of evolution
with TST and SST, respectively. This interpret-
ation would strongly support TST and SST, as
it would equate the function of dreaming with
two main principles of evolution in general. In
this broad sense, however, certain attributes like
learning capacity or motor skills increase fitness
in terms of natural selection, but do not neces-
sarily serve to help us avoid direct threats. Like-
wise, certain attributes such as emotion regula-
tion  or  artistic  creativity  increase  fitness  in
terms of social selection, but are not necessarily
themselves social in a strict sense. Ultimately, of
course,  all  these  functions  serve  reproductive
success—however, if any skill ultimately helping
us to acquire sexual partners is interpreted as
social and any possible obstacle to reproduction
is interpreted as a threat, then TST and SST
would be trivial, as a biological function is by
definition one that supports  reproductive suc-
cess.  In  contrast,  if  TST and  SST are  inter-
preted in a more narrow, non-trivial way, there
is ample space in dreams for further functions:
consolidation  of  navigational  information  ac-
quired  during  exploration;  rehearsal  of  a  re-
cently learned motor sequence; facilitation of a
behavior  recently  rewarded  with  food;  incub-
ated creative insight into the solution of a re-
cent  unsuccessful  attempt  to  build  a  helpful
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tool; refinement of the discriminative skills re-
garding  recently  perceived  pattern,  etc.—all
these potential benefits of sleep and dreaming
increase inclusive fitness of the individual, but
do not directly refer to the simulation of threats
or social interactions.
This problem can further be illustrated by
Revonsuo’s  (1995,  2006)  approach,  where  he
considers any phenomenal experience as a vir-
tual world model: what is the function of wak-
ing consciousness, threat avoidance, or social in-
teraction? Both threat avoidance and social in-
teraction,  of  course—and  many  others.  That
this  rather  uninformative  answer  can  also  be
transferred  back  to  the  function  of  dreaming
might be illustrated with another ubiquitous ex-
ample of simulation: in child’s play, simulation
of  real  life  and  the  practice  of  skills  needed
therein is considered one of the main functions
—play allows children to simulate coping with
threats in a safe environment, and to develop
the  social  skills  needed  later  in  life  (Mellou
1994;  Pellegrini &  Bjorklund 2004).  However,
these aspects, while important, are not the only
functions of play—it also offers the rehearsal of
motor and sensory skills, training in predatory
behavior, and general intellectual development.
Hence, child’s play can be considered multifunc-
tional,  as  can  waking  or  dreaming  conscious-
ness.
Segmentation of  reality (including dream
reality) is  possible along numerous lines.  In a
sense, TST and SST could be interpreted as ex-
pressing  two  orthogonal  dimensions  of  dream
space: a security dimension with the directions
threat vs. safety, and a sociality dimension with
the directions social vs. individual. Dreamed ac-
cidents or natural disasters would be character-
ized by low security and sociality, dreamed ex-
perience of bullying by high sociality and low
security, and dreamed bonding by high sociality
and security, etc. Threat and social interactions
in a narrow sense are important aspects both of
waking and dreaming life, however they are not
the only aspects. Other segmentations are also
possible, e.g., by a dimension of motor activity
vs.  inactivity,  or  emotional  vs.  neutral  dream
content, or a novelty dimension. In the broad
sense of natural and social selection, threat and
social interaction would be the two main drivers
of evolution, however to the cost that the an-
swer to the question of the function of dreaming
becomes a trivial “to support reproductive suc-
cess”. Of note is that also the other discussed
functions might be interpreted within a simula-
tion  framework:  e.g.,  simulation  visuomotor
activity after learning a respective task in the
memory  function,  simulating  affective  experi-
ences in  the emotion regulation function,  and
simulating problem solving attempts in the cre-
ativity  function.  These  different  functions  are
neither  mutually  exclusive  nor  strictly  inde-
pendent from each other. In particular the emo-
tion-processing  function  largely  overlaps  with
both TST an SST—all threats and at least the
most important social interactions induce strong
emotions, and successful coping with these emo-
tions would be of considerable help when facing
threats or social situations. Also other functions
of dreaming overlap with TST and SST: consol-
idation  of  threat-related  information  or  social
gossip improves threat avoidance or social skills,
as does creative incubation on threat-related or
social problems. On a more abstract level, all
these  simulations  serve  the  integration  of  re-
cently experienced information into the behavi-
oral repertoire in order to adapt it to the cur-
rent waking environment (Hobson et al. 2014).
Identifying the original function of a given
trait has proven to be a notoriously difficult is-
sue in the philosophy of biology (Wouters 2013).
Dreaming might have originally developed as an
epiphenomenon  of  rather  basal  neurophysiolo-
gical sleep functions, and this phenomenological
level might eventually have acquired additional
functions.  Such  exaptations  (Gould &  Vrba
1982) might have been further adapted and in
turn  developed  further  neurophysiological  ex-
aptations without phenomenological correlates,
etc. The original function of dreaming might be
unimportant  today  compared  to  subsequently
evolved functions. Instead of singling out one or
two functions of dreaming as original, dreaming
might be best seen as a multifunctional general
reality  simulator,  including  the  simulation  of
motor  skills,  emotional  processing,  problem
solving  attempts,  threats,  and  social  interac-
tions.  To follow specific  research questions,  of
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course  certain  functions  still  could  be  high-
lighted and followed as research heuristics with
a  given  purpose.  All  functions  of  sleep  and
dreaming serve reproductive success ultimately,
even  though  some  might  be  more  important
than others from a selection point of view. For
all  dream functions  discussed  in  this  chapter,
there are convincing supporting but also incon-
sistent data. The fact that dreaming is not an
unselective simulation of the waking world as,
e.g., the continuity hypothesis suggests (Schredl
&  Hofmann 2003), is a sign that some simula-
tion functions might  be  more  important  than
others. We should note, however, that quantit-
ative  overrepresentation  of  a  specific  function
does not necessarily prove the primacy of this
function: different functions might rely on dif-
ferent processes with different timescales, with a
highly important function potentially requiring
only seconds to be processed,  while an unim-
portant function might take hours. In times of
sufficient sleep, dream content related to the re-
latively  unimportant  function  might  thus  be
overrepresented. The relative importance of one
function over another might be tested in cases
of  scarcity of  sleep,  e.g.,  under sleep depriva-
tion,  when  different  functions  would  have  to
compete for restricted simulation time. Also of
interest  in  this  regard  is  a  comparative  ap-
proach:  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  sleep
propensity, and particularly REM sleep, negat-
ively correlates with predatory risk across spe-
cies  (Lima et  al. 2005),  which  would  rather
speak against TST. Concerning SST, the tend-
ency to sleep in  groups has been reported to
negatively  correlate  with  sleep  time,  which,
however, has been interpreted either in terms of
social sleep being more efficient due to reduced
predatory risk, or as more social species sacrifi-
cing sleep to service social relationships during
wakefulness (Capellini et al. 2008). Against this
background, sleep and dreaming pose an optim-
ization problem: how much time is best spent
asleep, spent in specific sleep stages, and spent
engaging in specific dream mentation in order
to optimize the interplay between the different
functions of sleep and dreaming? Dreaming as a
general  reality  simulator  might  dynamically
change  its  functional  priorities,  favoring  one
over the other of its several functions, depend-
ing on the current requirements and constraints
of the environment.
8 The oblivious avatar
Even though it is likely that no ‘original’ func-
tion  of  dreaming  can  be  acknowledged,  but
rather a multiplicity of functions depending on
specific research questions and segmentations of
the dream space, one aspect of dreaming might
distinguish TST and SST from other functions
of sleep and dreaming, including other simula-
tion functions: obliviousness of the avatar about
being in a dream. Impaired insight into the own
state of mind is a hallmark of normal dreaming,
(Dresler et  al. 2015a).  The well-known excep-
tion of this symptom of most dreams is the case
of lucid dreaming (Dresler et al. 2015), which in
turn can be used to test whether state oblivi-
ousness  is  indeed  a  characterizing  feature  of
TST and SST when compared with other dream
functions.
There is no obvious reason why oblivious-
ness about the dream state would be necessary
for the memory function of sleep and dreaming.
For  procedural  memory  consolidation,  lucid
dreaming has  even been  suggested  as  a  state
that allows for a hyper-realistic mental training
of  recently  learned  motor  skills  (Erlacher &
Chapin 2010). Several studies support this idea:
lucidly  dreamed  training  of  coin  tossing  (Er-
lacher & Schredl 2010) or a finger tapping task
(Stumbrys et al. 2015) has been demonstrated
to be effective,  and a considerable  number of
professional athletes use lucid dreams to prac-
tice sports skills, with most of them having the
impression  that  their  performance  is  thereby
improved (Erlacher et al. 2011). For the creativ-
ity and insight function of sleep and dreaming,
obliviousness  regarding  the  current  state  of
mind is no prerequisite, and lucid dreaming has
explicitly been suggested and shown to be used
as a tool to increase creative processes (Stum-
brys &  Daniels 2010;  Schädlich &  Erlacher
2012; Stumbrys et al. 2014). As with non-lucid
dreaming, lucid dreaming is associated with de-
focussed attention and flat association hierarch-
ies—lucid dreams have been reported to include
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even  more  uncommon  and  bizarre  elements
than non-lucid  dreams  (McCarley &  Hoffman
1981).  At  the  same  time,  regained  reflective
capabilities enable the creative dreamer to eval-
uate new associations and ideas, a step in the
phase  model  of  creativity  that  for  non-lucid
dreams is reserved for subsequent wakefulness.
This mechanism is illustrated by two interesting
case studies:  Barrett (2001) describes the case
of a painter who in his lucid dreams visited gal-
leries, and then searching for interesting motifs
to be painted soon after awakening from the lu-
cid dream. A comparable strategy was used by
one of our own study participants (Dresler et al.
2011, 2012), a music composer: when he aimed
to compose a new piece of music, he turned on
a radio in his lucid dreams and changed radio
stations until  he heard a composition that he
considered interesting. He then woke himself up
and wrote the new composition down. In line
with these data, questionnaire studies reported
that frequent lucid dreamers might be more cre-
ative  than  less-frequent  lucid  dreamers
(Blagrove & Hartnell 2000).
For  the  emotion  regulation  function  of
sleep and dreaming the situation is less clear,
however here there is also some evidence indic-
ating that obliviousness is not generally neces-
sary: for the case of positive affects, subjects of-
ten report that lucid dreams are associated with
particularly positive emotions. And for negative
affects, the successful use of lucid dreaming as a
therapeutic tool in affective disorders indicates
that dream lucidity does not interfere with the
emotion  regulation  function  of  dreaming
(Holzinger 2014). 
In contrast, for those cases where a general
emotion regulation function of  dreaming over-
laps with the TST, the necessity of staying ig-
norant about the true state of consciousness be-
comes obvious: to successfully serve as an au-
thentic simulation of a threat, the dreamer has
to take the threat as real and thus be oblivious
towards his true state of mind. The cognitive
insight  that  everything  encountered  consists
only  of  hallucinated  dream imagery  and thus
cannot harm the dreamer in reality immediately
takes the sting out of  the threatening experi-
ence. This mechanism has been successfully util-
ized  for  recurrent  nightmares,  where  lucid
dreaming has been demonstrated to be of thera-
peutic  value  (Spoormaker et  al. 2003,  2006;
Dresler et al. 2015;  Rak et al. in press). Thus,
for the threat simulation function of dreaming,
obliviousness  regarding  the  current  state  of
mind is essential. 
For SST, several lines of evidence indicate
that obliviousness regarding the current state of
mind is a prerequisite for social simulation to be
effective. During normal dreams, non-self dream
characters  are  attributed  with  feelings  and
thoughts just like in waking life (Kahn & Hob-
son 2005).  Being  oblivious  about  the  true
nature of these dream characters might ensure
that  non-perfect  social  simulations  are  also
taken  as  autonomous  agents  instead  of  mere
puppets controlled by the dreamer: dream char-
acters are often implausible compared to their
real-life waking counterparts (Kahn &  Hobson
2003) , however, are nevertheless recognized and
identified without major puzzlement (Kahn et
al. 2000,  2002b).  During  a  lucid  dream,  im-
plausible dream characters might be treated less
seriously by the dreamer, rendering the social
simulation  much  less  effective.  This  is  illus-
trated by a recent study demonstrating that be-
ing tickled by an intentionally-controlled non-
self dream character during a lucid dream was
comparably  ineffective  as  self-tickling  during
wakefulness, whereas being unexpectedly tickled
by another  dream character  felt  more ticklish
(Windt et al. 2014). Non-self dream characters
lead to different predictions depending on their
perceived autonomy, and their respective simu-
lation  thus  serves  different  functions.  Lucid
dreaming frequency correlates with the amount
of control over the dream (Wolpin et al. 1992;
Stumbrys et al. 2014),  implying that frequent
lucid dreamers would conceive dream characters
as  less  autonomous  than  less  frequent  lucid
dreamers. Thus, although non-self dream char-
acters appear to have quasi-independent mental
lives during lucid dreams (Tholey 1989), convin-
cing training of social skills would require the
dreamer to be oblivious to the fact that dream
characters are not real, but hallucinated. 
In summary, in contrast to other functions
of sleep and dreaming, TST and SST essentially
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depend on state obliviousness of  the dreamer.
State obliviousness in dreaming might therefore
be seen as a prime example of an epistemic con-
straint of phenomenal experience that leads to
new and beneficial functional properties (Met-
zinger 2003).  While  both TST and SST (and
other functions of sleep) might be applicable to
humans and other social animals alike, state ob-
liviousness might be a function that specifically
developed in humans: it is unlikely that animals
without  sophistic  language  skills  possess  the
ability to reflect on their current state of mind
and compare  it  to  alternative  mind-states.  In
turn,  such  animals  do  not  need  a  differential
mechanism switching state reflectiveness on and
off depending on the current vigilance state. Of
note, neural correlates of state reflectiveness, i.e.
lucid  dreaming,  strikingly  mirror  brain  differ-
ences seen in humans vs. non-human primates
(Dresler et al. 2013). 
9 Conclusion
Sleep and dreaming do not serve a single biolo-
gical  function,  but  are  multifunctional  states.
Their  functions  include  memory  consolidation
and integration,  emotion  regulation,  creativity
and problem solving, and preparation for wak-
ing life. One promising description level is that
of dreaming as a general reality simulator. TST
and  SST  describe  two  important  purposes  of
simulation,  namely  successful  coping  with
threats  and  social  interactions.  The  merit  of
TST and SST is not so much that they conclus-
ively  explain  the  function  of  dreaming—al-
though  they  represent  the  two  classical  prin-
ciples of evolution, natural and social selection,
there  are  also  several  other  sleep  and  dream
functions. TST and SST might be the only can-
didates  among the multiple  functions of  sleep
and dreaming that explain a particularly strik-
ing feature of dream phenomenology: dreaming
is  a remarkably realistic  simulation of  waking
life, with the exception of a complete failure to
successfully reflect on the current state of con-
sciousness.  Veridical  insight  into  the  dream
state is biologically possible, as the phenomenon
of lucid dreaming demonstrates. The fact that
state reflectiveness is nevertheless generally ab-
sent in dreaming—dream lucidity is a rare phe-
nomenon (Schredl &  Erlacher 2011), and even
during lucid dreams, lucidity lapses are common
(Barrett 1992)—, suggests that state oblivious-
ness  during  dreaming has  an important  func-
tion. As demonstrated here, among the different
candidates for explaining the function of dream-
ing, TST and SST are the only ones that are
capable  of  elucidating  this  specific  function:
state obliviousness is necessary for the effective
simulation of threats and social interactions. 
Even  though  recent  neurobiological  re-
search has begun to reveal the neural correlates
of state reflectiveness and, by contrast, of state
obliviousness (Voss et al. 2009, 2014; Dresler et
al. 2012),  the specific  neural  mechanisms pre-
venting  the  dreaming brain  from realizing  its
full repertoire of cognitive capabilities are still
largely  unclear.  Further  research  into  these
mechanisms might enable exciting opportunities
for sleep and dream research by revealing simple
methods of dream-lucidity induction. However,
if such ways to induce a simulated reality under
full control of its user become available too eas-
ily and broadly, this might also lead to unfore-
seen problems, as at least two important func-
tions of dreaming—simulation of threats and so-
cial interactions—probably cannot be processed
without state obliviousness. This proposed ne-
cessity generates a testable hypothesis: individu-
als with very frequent lucid dreams can be ex-
pected to differ from the majority of infrequent
lucid dreamers in their threat-avoidance and so-
cial skills.
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